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Abstract Habitats and the ecosystem services they provide
are part of the world’s portfolio of natural capital assets.
Like many components of this portfolio, it is difficult to
assess the full economic value of these services, which
tends to over-emphasize the value of extractive activities
such as coastal development. Building on recent ecological
studies of species–habitat linkages, we use a bioeconomic
model to value multiple types of habitats as natural capital,
using mangroves, sea grass, and coral reefs as our model
system. We show how key ecological variables and
processes, including obligate and facultative behaviors
map into habitat values and how the valuation of these
ecological processes can inform decisions regarding coastal
development (habitat clearing). Our stylized modeling
framework also provides a clear and concise road map for
researchers interested in understanding how to make the
link between ecosystem function, ecosystem service, and
conservation policy decisions. Our findings also highlight
the importance of additional ecological research into how
species utilize habitats and that this research is not just
important for ecological science, but it can and will
influence ecosystem service values that, in turn, will impact
coastal land-use decisions. While refining valuation methods
is not necessarily going to lead to more rational coastal land-
use decisions, it will improve our understanding on the
ecological–economic mechanisms that contribute to the
value of our natural capital assets.
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Introduction
Habitats and the ecosystem services they provide are part of
the world’s portfolio of natural capital assets (Daily et al.
2000; Balmford et al. 2002). Like many components of this
portfolio, it is difficult to assess the full economic value of
these services, which tends to overemphasize the value of
extractive activities such as coastal development that are
easier to measure.
Mangroves are a classic example of a globally threatened
habitat that provides harvestable products (i.e., fish, wood)
and ecological services (hurricane protection; trapping of
sediment which enhances water quality; Barbier et al.
2008). The primary threats to mangroves are coastal
development, conversion to shrimp aquaculture, pollution,
and wood harvesting (Valiela et al. 2001). Several authors
attribute current trends in the loss of mangroves to the
failure to place an appropriate economic value on their
ecological services (Ronnback 1999; Barbier 2000) and that
proper mangrove valuation is the first step in the sustain-
able development of mangrove ecosystems (Lugo 2002).
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While we acknowledge that placing values on nature is a
controversial exercise (McCauley 2006), we take a prag-
matic perspective that is grounded in the realization that
habitats are currently being valued in cost-benefit analysis,
albeit rather imprecisely. Examples from the United States
include natural resource damage assessment cases under the
US Oil Spill Prevention Act of 1990, permitting decisions
under Section 404 of the USCleanWater Act, and designation
of Essential Fish Habitat under the US Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act.
To arrive at the total economic value of a habitat, we
need to measure all of the use and nonuse values of their
services (Bockstael et al. 2000; Heal et al. 2005)—values
that depend on economic factors, such as marketable
services (e.g., fish, timber, carbon) and nonmarket services
(e.g., biodiversity), and ecological factors, such as growth
rates, density-dependence mechanisms, and species–habitat
associations. For example, there is the distinction between
obligate use, where a particular habitat type is absolutely
necessary for the species survival, and facultative use,
where a habitat supplements a species growth, but the
habitat is not necessary for survival (Ronnback 1999).
Valuing habitats is not a new endeavor, and previous
studies have focused on assigning value to a habitat’s role
in the “production” of a marketable commodity, such as
commercially harvested fish (Lynne et al. 1981; Freeman
1991; Barbier 2000, 2007; Barbier et al. 2002). An
important finding is how the management institution, such
as open-access, common property, or sole ownership,
affects the value of the services provided by the habitat
(Freeman 1991; Barbier et al. 2002). For example, under
open-access conditions where the returns to the fishery are
dissipated in equilibrium, the value of the fishery with or
without mangroves is equal to zero in equilibrium. Smith
(2007) illustrates, however, that although the equilibrium
value is zero, there is potential for value generated in the
transition to the equilibrium.
Although these previous analysis of habitat–fishery link-
ages provide analysis relevant to the particular ecosystems
and question of interest, techniques have not previously been
developed to incorporate the variable associations of species
with habitats that often occur in nature. Ecologists have
shown, for example, that many species utilize different
habitats at different stages of ontogeny and that the use of
these habitats is often facultative (Nagelkerken et al. 2002).
For example, some commercially important coral reef fish,
particularly those in the families snapper (Lutjanidae) and
grunt (Haemulidae) spend their juvenile phase in sea grass
beds then migrate to mangroves for a period of time before
finally migrating to their adult reef habitat. In the absence
of mangroves, these species migrate directly from sea grass
beds to reefs. While the use of mangroves is mostly
facultative by reef fish, ecosystems offering mangrove
nurseries have a higher standing crop of adult reef fish
(Nagelkerken et al. 2002; Mumby et al. 2004). Surprisingly,
to our knowledge, there are no bioeconomic models that
incorporate both facultative and obligate associations of
species among multiple types of habitats.
Building on recent ecological studies of species–habitat
linkages (Mumby et al. 2004; Harborne et al. 2006; Mumby
2006), we contribute to the science of valuing multiple
types of habitats as natural capital, using mangroves, sea
grass, and coral reefs as our model system. Our model does
apply to other coastal ecosystems where species utilize
multiple types of habitat in their life cycle. The contribu-
tions of the paper are: (1) to illuminate how key ecological
variables and processes, including different species–habitat
associations map into ecosystem service values and (2) to
show how the valuation of these ecological processes maps
into the opportunity cost of clearing the mangroves that can
be used to inform decisions regarding coastal development
(habitat clearing).
Our paper also contributes to the broader economic–
ecological research goal that calls for the further develop-
ment and refinement of production methods to measure and
value ecosystem services (Heal 2000; Balmford et al. 2002;
Heal et al. 2005; Kremen and Ostfeld 2005; Kareiva et al.
2007). With improved measurement, the possibilities to
develop payment systems for ecosystem services and other
conservation tools that take into account their total
economic value are enhanced (Heal et al. 2005).
Methods
The key findings in Mumby et al. (2004) that guide the
development of our bioeconomic model are: (1) the availability
of different juvenile habitats (sea grass beds and mangroves)
partly determine the biomass of adult fish on coral reefs
because survival rates of juveniles vary among habitats; and
(2) fish species–mangrove functional relationships in coral-reef
systems tend to be facultative rather than obligate. In particular,
we model a biological (fish) species whose adults are
sedentary on a coral reef but which utilizes sea grass and
mangrove habitats during its juvenile phase. Fishing pressure
occurs on the reefs and is regulated under a licensed limited-
entry fishery where the regulators are controlling the total level
of fishing effort (or boats). We describe the biological and
economic model and then the calculation of mangrove habitat
value, based on mangroves serving as an input into the
“production” of the fish population being harvested.
Biological model
New individuals recruit to the reef either directly from the
sea grass beds or after an intermediate nursery stage within
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mangroves (Fig. 1). In any period, a share of the juveniles
produced from the adult, reef-based population, denoted N,
will return directly to the reefs after spending time in sea
grass. Once these juveniles return to the reef, they are
susceptible to increased (prey) mortality, and we define the
survivorship rate for these juveniles as Sr. Those juveniles
in sea grass that do not migrate directly to the reef migrate
instead to a mangrove patch that is accessible from both the
sea grass and reef habitats. Based on field observations,
Mumby (2006) assumes that the maximum distance fish
migrate between mangroves and reefs is 10 km. Consistent
with Chittaro et al. (2005), the survivorship of the species
that utilize the mangroves (Sm) is greater than the rate for
species that go directly to the reef (Sr).
Because for policy analysis we need the incremental
value of mangroves (Bockstael et al. 2000), we model the
fraction of the population that returns to the reef from the
sea grass beds (1−W(M)) or migrates to the mangroves
W(M) as a continuous function of the percent of cover, M,
of the mangrove habitat. That is, when M is equal to one,
the mangrove habitat is pristine and as M goes to zero, the
coverage of mangroves decreases toward zero. We deviate
from the Mumby et al. (2004) study that measured the
effect of mangroves in terms of mangroves being present or
absent within a certain distance of the reef and mangroves.
The continuous specification of W(M), therefore, is not
empirically verified, but it seems likely that the mangrove
coverage in the system will determine the number of juveniles
using the mangroves as a refuge from predation. In our
setting, the depth of the mangrove habitat is less important
than the coastal perimeter of habitat, as most species remain
within the edge area. Aburto-Oropeza et al. (2008) found
the perimeter to be more valuable in Mexican reefs.
Our formulation is consistent with species-choosing
habitats to improve their survivorship. For example, the
ability of larval reef fishes to sense the presence of
settlement habitat and swim toward it is well established,
either using sound (Simpson et al. 2005) or chemical signatures
of different habitats (e.g., sea grass; Arvedlund and Takemura
2006). What is not clear, however, is the type of functional
responses W(M) that would follow as the coverage of
mangroves changes. For now, we only impose the following
properties: W 0ð Þ ¼ 0; W 1ð Þ  1; d W Mð Þ=d M > 0. The
first says that if there are no mangroves, the fraction of
juvenile fish utilizing them is zero. The second allows for the
possibility that even though the mangroves are pristine, some
of the juveniles might recruit directly from sea grass to reef.
The third states that the fraction utilizing the mangroves
increases as the coverage of mangroves increases, everything
else being equal. This would be the case, for example, if the
chemical signatures or sound increased with the coverage of
mangroves.
In any period, recruitment to the reef depends on the
number of larvae/juveniles produced from the standing
stock of adults on the reef in the previous period, the share
of juveniles utilizing the mangroves or reefs, and the
relative survivorship of these individuals. Putting these
together, recruitment is equal to R(t)=J(N(t))(W(M)Sm+
(1−W(M))Sr), where J(N(t)) is the number of larvae/
juveniles produced in any period from the current popula-
tion of adults on the reef. Specifically, J is represented as
J N tð Þð Þ ¼ qNa where α and θ are non-negative. Egg
production is often thought to follow increasing returns to
scale per individual, and we can model this with the
assumption that α is greater than one. Theta could be
modeled as a function of the coverage and quality of the sea
grass beds, but for simplicity, we assume that it is a
constant parameter.
As just presented, R(t) captures a facultative association
dependent on the levels of survivorship in reef and
mangrove habitats. In such a setting, the mangroves provide
an enhancement to survivorship, but the reefs are still able
to supply a growing population if mangroves are absent.
The obligate relationship occurs when survivorship on the
reef, Sr, is equal to zero. In this case, the reef population is
directly dependent on the recruits from the mangroves, and
if the mangroves are completely removed, the population
will go extinct.
Next, we map the flow of recruits into the fishable
population of adults on the reef. The instantaneous rates of
change for the reef’s adult fish stock is: dN/dt=F(N,g(R))−
qETN, where qETN is the catch, q is a catchability
coefficient, ET is the aggregate fishing effort level, F(N,g
(R)) is the growth of adult biomass on the reef, and g(R) is
the recruitment function to the reef. Because we assume
that the juvenile/larval phases of the species life cycle
exhibit fast dynamics while the dynamics of adult biomass
on the reef are slow, we only need to track the population
on the reefs rather than the populations in the different
Fig. 1 Schematic of a facultative association Note: Juveniles going
from reef to sea grass is J(N), share of juveniles to mangrove is W(M)
J(N), share of juveniles going directly from the sea grass beds to the
reef is (1−W(M)) J(N)), recruits to the reef in period t is R(t)=W(M)
J(N) Sm+(1−W(M)) J(N)) Sr, where Sm and Sr are the survivorship
rates in the mangroves and reef, respectively
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habitats. This gains us tractability and could be generalized
easily.
There are many possible specifications for F(N,g(R)).
One issue is whether recruits face two density-dependent
processes during the settlement phase. That is, recruits can
compete with other recruits for space and resources during
settlement, and they might also compete with the standing
stock of adults on the reef (it should be borne in mind that
the “recruits” are not postlarvae, but individuals of near-
adult or adult size that have migrated from other habitats
and are therefore more likely to utilize similar resources to
resident adults). We allow for this possibility by specifying
the following growth function: F(N,R)=g(R)(1−N/K),
where K is the carrying capacity on the reef. The
unexploited equilibrium of our growth equation (e.g., ET=0)
occurs when the adult biomass level is equal to the reef’s
carrying capacity. This holds regardless of the specification
of g(Ri). It is important to note, however, that mangrove
coverage will affect the exploited equilibrium (qETNi>0) in
nontrivial ways. Mangroves in our formulation increase the
growth rate on the reef in a nonlinear manner, where greater
coverage of mangroves leads to faster recovery of the reef
populations.
Following Armsworth (2002), we assume that g(R)=
b1Ri/(1+b2Ri). This implies that recruits enter the reef
according to a Beverton–Holt recruitment function where
b1 describes the survival rate at low densities, and b1/b2 is
the saturation limit. With b2=0, the recruits compete only
with the standing stock of adults during settlement.





a W Mð ÞSmð þ 1W Mð Þð ÞSrð Þ








The economic value for the mangrove habitat as captured
through fishery–habitat linkages depends on the same
economic factors that contribute to fishing profits including
ex-vessel fish prices, fishing technology, fishing costs, and
fishing effort levels. For example, if the price of the fish
being caught is low, everything else being equal, we would
expect that the value of the mangrove through the fishery–
habitat linkage would correspondingly be low.
The relationship with respect to fishing effort is more
complex, however, because it depends on regulations
regarding entry and exit of fishing effort and the character-
istics of the fishing operation. If the fishery is under open-
access conditions where fishermen are free to enter and exit
(Smith 1969), then, in the long-run, the equilibrium profits
are dissipated (Gordon 1954). Dissipating all profits in the
long-run is also possible when the regulator restricts a
single dimension of fishing effort, such as vessel length, as
fishermen will continue to invest in the unrestricted inputs,
such as vessel power or hours worked, to give them a
competitive advantage (Wilen 1985; Homans and Wilen
1997). On the other hand, if the regulator charges a
landings tax or tax per unit of effort in the fishery, then
gross fishing profits (that is before the taxes are netted out)
are not dissipated (Sanchirico 2003). Finally, allocating
shares of the catch to fishermen has also been shown to
lead to positive profits (Newell et al. 2005). When the value
of the fishery is not dissipated in equilibrium, corresponds
to situations where the value of mangroves is positive.
Additional complexities arise when one (appropriately)
considers not just the equilibrium value, but the value
generated during the transitional from one equilibrium to
another (Smith 2007).
Because our focus is on mapping ecological behavior to
habitat value, we abstract away from many of these
complexities and utilize a parsimonious economic model.
Although the issues just described affect the magnitude of
the habitat–fishery values and therefore are critical in an
empirical analysis of ecosystem services, these factors do
not affect our theoretical conclusions. The general recipe
for mapping ecosystem functions to services to coastal land
uses is not affected.
We assume that the coral reef fishery consists of a
licensed limited-entry system, where the single input factor
fishing effort is capped by a regulatory agency, and the
fishing vessels must pay a fee to participate. In our setting,
the fee is determined endogenously depending on the
economic conditions in the fishery. Although many
fisheries around the world have a limit on the number of
vessels allowed to fish (OECD 1997), we are not aware of
any that set the license price using economic analysis. We
choose this setup because by varying the total level of effort
in the fishery, we can simulate the levels of fishing effort
associated with different institutional systems from open-
access (zero license price) to more restrictive systems that
includes the level of effort that maximizes net benefits from
the fishery (Sanchirico and Wilen 2002; Sanchirico 2004).
We assume that the catch from this reef makes up a small
portion of the region’s supply of fish, and therefore, the
price of fish is exogenous and constant. We have relaxed
this assumption and the results with respect to the differences
between the values generated by obligate and facultative
behaviors are qualitatively identical. We maintain the
exogenous price assumptions because it permits closed-form
analytical solutions.
Gross fishing profit (π) is a function of the level of
effort permitted by the regulator (ET) and the size of the
fish stock on the reef (N). Specifically, gross fishing profit
is: π(ET,N)=pqETN−cET where p is the ex-vessel price of
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fish, c is cost per unit of effort that includes the
opportunity cost of fishing capital plus fishing costs. In
our licensed limited-entry setting, the relevant measure of
long-run equilibrium fishing profits nets out the license
price (L) or π(ET,N,L)=pqETN−cET−LET. We can also
interpret the license price as a tax per unit of effort but in
such a setting, the regulator would set the tax and fishing
effort is the free variable. We model the level of fishing
effort as exogenous, and the license price is determined
endogenously.
If the regulator sets ET equal or greater than the level that
corresponds to the open access level ET1ð Þ, then L will
equal to zero (a negative license price does not make sense;
Sanchirico and Wilen 2002). In this way, our setup nests the
open-access equilibrium. If ET is less than the open access
level, then the economic returns (producer surplus or rent)
per unit of effort are positive and equal to L. Furthermore,
as ET approaches ET1, the license price goes to zero,
everything else being equal.
Measuring the value of mangroves
To determine the contribution of mangroves to the
equilibrium value of the fishery and to the costs and
benefits of coastal land-use decisions, we make the
following calculations. First, we solve for the long-run
equilibrium of fish stock, Neq, and the license price, Leq, for
a given level of total fishing effort. This occurs where net
profits (π) are zero, and Eq. 1 is at rest for each level of ET.
Specifically, we have the following equations that define
the equilibrium (Neq, Leq):
b1 qNa W Mð ÞSmð þ 1W Mð Þð ÞSrð Þ





 qETN ¼ 0
pqETN  cET  LET ¼ 0
ð2Þ
Recall that the facultative association occurs when (Sm,
Sr)>(0,0), and the obligate occurs when Sm>0 and Sr=0.
Second, we calculate the equilibrium total value of the
fishery (V), which is equal to the level of effort times the per
unit value of effort (Leq), where V(ET,M)≡ET×Leq(ET,M). We
then investigate how the total value changes for different
levels of fishing effort and mangroves. The analysis is done
for both facultative and obligate associations. Because we
are only focusing on the equilibrium value, we find that at
the open-access effort level ET1ð Þ that V(ET,M) is equal to
zero regardless of the different habitat associations. A similar
conclusion with respect to the equilibrium returns under
open-access conditions with and without marine reserves is
found in Sanchirico and Wilen (2001).
Finally, we investigate the implications of different
habitat associations on coastal land use decisions by
deriving the marginal opportunity cost (foregone fishing
value) from a loss in mangrove coverage. The marginal
opportunity cost is simply the change in the total value of the
fishery with a change in the mangroves (dV(ET,M)/dM)).
When we calculate the opportunity cost of clearing
mangroves, we are in essence drawing out the supply curve
of mangroves. In theory, the market for clearing mangroves
will be at equilibrium when the supply curve is equal to the
marginal benefit (or demand) curve derived from the
economic values associated with converting the mangroves.
The intersection of the demand and supply curve yields the
level of mangrove conversion. It would not be the level that
maximizes net social benefits, however, because we are not
considering all of the opportunity costs associated with
mangrove conversion (e.g., flood control, water quality,
storm protection). A similar analysis was recently illustrated
in Barbier et al. (2008).
Results
To derive analytical results on the value of habitat, we
assume that the recruits only compete with the standing
stock on the reefs during the settlement process (b2=0) and
that the number of juveniles is linearly related to the size of
the population (α=1). Under these assumptions, the closed
form equilibrium solutions for the fish stock and the license
price are:
N eq ¼ K 1 qE
T
qbo Sr þ Sm  Srð ÞW Mð Þð Þ
 
ð3Þ
Leq ¼ pqK 1 qE
T
qbo Sr þ Sm  Srð ÞW Mð Þð Þ
 
 c ð4Þ
Equation 3 shows that the equilibrium fish stock (Neq)
decreases as fishing effort (ET) increases. The effect of
fishing effort on the equilibrium population, however, is
muted by the presence of the mangroves (see Fig. S1 in
supplementary material). That is, for higher levels of
mangroves, we find that the equilibrium population on the
reef is higher at the same effort level (note: M2>M1→
W(M2)>W(M1)). We also find that higher levels of fishing
effort can be supported with greater levels of mangroves.
What are the potential implications of these findings?
Suppose, for example, if we are at an effort level, ET2 and
the level of mangroves is M2, then the equilibrium
population level is Ne2 . If, however, the mangroves are
cleared and effort is not changed simultaneously, it is very
possible that ET2 will drive the population extinct. Man-
groves, therefore, provide an important buffer against
excess levels of fishing effort (Kareiva et al. 2007). The
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magnitude of the “buffering” effect is calculated by ∂Neq/




T Sm  Srð Þ






Equation 5 shows that the size of the buffer depends on
the bump in survivorship (Sm−Sr), how species utilize the
habitat (dW(M)/dM), the sea grass effect (θ), and the fishing
effort level (ET). Sea grass beds have a similar buffering
effect (dNeq/dθ>0). This result highlights the value of
ecological research on understanding the differences in
survivorship across habitats (Sm, Sr, θ) and how species find
and utilize the habitats (W(M)) for species conservation.
Total value of the fishery
How do mangroves impact the total value of the fishery?
Under our assumptions, we can solve for the total value,
which is equal to:
V ET ;M
  ¼ LeqET
¼ pKq 1 qE
T






We illustrate in Fig. 2 panel A and B Eq. 6 as a function
of the total effort level for different levels of mangrove
availability. For the facultative case (panel A), the optimal
level of effort in the fishery (level where the total value is at
its maximum) increases as the amount of mangroves
increase. We also see that for a given level of effort, the
value of the fishery is higher with mangroves than without.
Furthermore, in some cases, the value of the fishery would
be zero if it were not for mangroves providing a bump in
survivorship. The mangrove and sea grass buffers, there-
fore, translate directly into value. We also find that the total
value of the fishery increases with the price of fish (p),
catchability of the fish (q) and decreases with the cost of
fishing effort, c.
For a given availability of mangroves, total fisheries
value is higher for all levels of fishing effort when the
association is facultative rather than obligate (Fig. 2B).
Under a facultative relationship, the habitat supplements
recruitment directly to the reef, and together, the effect of
recruitment occurring through two pathways is larger than
when there is only recruitment via the mangroves. This
effect would be reduced somewhat if the recruits competed
with one another during settlement (b2>0).
In order to explore the influence of mangrove availability
on fishery value, we impose the additional property that the
mangrove function (W(M)) increases at a decreasing rate in
mangroves (d2W(M)/dM2<0). Ecologically, this relation-
ship can be due to competition among juveniles for
mangrove resources or reflect the difficulty in finding
mangroves as their availability declines.
Figure 2c and d shows that for a given effort level, the































































Fig. 2 Fishery–habitat associa-
tions and total value. a The total
value of the fishery for different
fishing effort levels and levels of
mangroves for a facultative as-
sociation. The solid line (gray)
parabola is drawn for the case
where there are no mangroves
(M=0). b The value of the
fishery in an obligate and facul-
tative association holding the
level of the mangroves fixed
across the two cases, where O is
for obligate and F is for facul-
tative; c The value of the fishery
over the range of mangroves for
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availability increases but at a decreasing rate. We also find
that a complex interaction emerges among the level of
fishing effort, mangrove coverage, and total fishery value,
where the effort level that results in the highest total value
depends critically on the level of the mangrove coverage.
We also find that the greater the amount of fishing effort
level, the greater is the minimum threshold of mangrove
coverage needed to ensure that the value of the fishery is
positive. A similar result holds for the facultative associa-
tion, but it takes higher effort levels than in the obligate
setting for this to occur. Such a situation is likely to occur if
the decision on whether to clear mangroves ignores their
value for fishery production.
Average value of the fishery
Because many studies of habitat valuation use average
values (Costanza et al. 1997), we also show how the
average value of the fishery with respect to fishing effort (V
(ET,L)/ET=Leq), and the average value with respect to
mangroves (V(ET,L)/M) varies with the coverage of man-
groves (Fig. 3). Intuitively, the license price (Leq) is the
amount that a vessel owner would be willing to pay (e.g.,
per hour) to fish on the reef. In the facultative case (panel
A) and the obligate setting (panel B), the shape of the
license price increases at a decreasing rate in the level of
mangroves, which is driven by the properties of W(M).
We also find that there is endogenous minimum threshold
of mangroves needed at a given fishing effort level for the
fishery to be become profitable. The threshold is determined
by setting Leq equal to zero and solving for the critical level
of mangrove coverage that is a function of economic and
ecological conditions in the fishery. Applying the implicit
function theorem, we can show that the threshold increases
with greater levels of fishing effort, and decreases with
higher survivorship in the mangroves (Sm) and higher quality
of the sea grass beds (θ). Finally, the amount a vessel owner
would be willing to pay to fish increases with the coverage
of mangroves, which highlights the potential for the fishery
to help fund the conservation of mangroves or the
development of a payment for ecosystem service scheme.
Figure 3c and d illustrates the average value with respect
to the coverage of mangroves (V(ET,L)/M or V/M) in a
facultative and obligate setting, respectively. Under both
settings, V/M varies based on the level of fishing effort. For
example, for very low levels of effort, V/M increases as
fishing effort is increased, and at higher levels of fishing
effort, it decreases as fishing effort is increased. For
expositional purposes, we illustrate the latter case. The
threshold level found in Fig. 3a and b is identical to the
ones illustrated in panel c and d, as it is determined by
the license price in both cases. The only exception is the
facultative case when the value of the license remains positive
at M=0 (in panel a, the vertical intercept is positive). In this





































































Fig. 3 Fishery–habitat associa-
tions and average value.
a Average value of the fishery
with respect to fishing effort
under a facultative association.
b Average value under an obli-
gate association. c The average
value with respect to mangrove
coverage under a facultative
association. d The average value
in an obligate setting. In all
cases, the following relation
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Opportunity cost of clearing mangroves (marginal values)
Beyond illustrating how the value of the fishery is tied to
the habitat and varies based on habitat associations, the
ecosystem service values can inform cost-benefit analyses
of whether to clear or modify a particular habitat. Imagine,
for example, a coastal planner confronted with the
following decision: whether to allow a tourism develop-
ment project to go ahead and if so, how large an area of the
coastal environment to convert? Although the costs of
converting the mangroves include lost storm protection, lost
nonuse values, etc (Barbier et al. 2008), we focus here on
the opportunity costs due to the reduced profits from
fishing the species that depend on them (Brown and
Roughgarden 1997; Bockstael et al. 2000).
The opportunity costs of converting the mangroves can
be thought of as the cost of supplying mangroves (really,
the coastal area) to the development market. On the other
hand, there are benefits to the development project. By
paring the opportunity cost (or supply function of man-
groves) with a hypothetical demand for mangrove habitat
based on the (marginal) benefits, we investigate how the
level of clearing undertaken by a rational coastal planner
varies with the different species–habitat associations and
with different fishing effort levels (level of clearing is
determined at the intersection of the demand and supply
curves). The opportunity costs of mangroves are also the
amount a fishermen would be willing to pay (ecosystem
service payment) to avoid the clearing.
Specifically, the opportunity costs are dV(ET,L)/dM,
which is equal to:





Sm  Srð Þ
qb1 Sr þ Sm  Srð ÞW Mð Þð Þ2
d W Mð Þ
d M
ð7Þ
For a facultative association, we find that the opportunity
cost increases with the amount of mangroves cleared and that
it increases with increased fishing effort levels (see Fig. S2 in
supplementary material). The coastal land use implication is
that with higher fishing effort levels, it pays to clear less
habitat, everything else being equal. Qualitatively similar
results hold for the obligate association. It is also easy to
show that the opportunity costs decrease with improved
conditions in the sea grass beds (dV/dMdθ<0). This is
because with greater numbers of juveniles surviving in the
sea grass beds (θ ↑), the number of recruits to the reef is













































bFig. 4 Opportunity costs and
coastal land-clearing. a and b
The opportunity cost of clearing
mangroves in mangrove space
(a) and in fishing effort space
(b). The intersection of the
hypothetical demand curve and
the opportunity cost curve deter-
mines the share of the mangroves
cleared. a, b F and O represent
facultative and obligate, respec-
tively. c The potential differences
between using average vs. mar-
ginal values of mangroves in
coastal land-use decisions where
V/M is the average value of the
fishery with respect to man-
groves, and dV/dM is the mar-
ginal value (opportunity cost)
with respect to mangroves
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We find that the opportunity cost is higher for obligate
than for facultative associations (Fig. 4a). Therefore, even
though the total and average values from fishing were lower
for the obligate relationship, we find that the marginal value
is higher due to the greater (marginal) effect that mangroves
have on the value of the fishery in the obligate rather than
facultative setting. An obligate habitat association, there-
fore, results in less conversion of the coastal environment
than when the association is facultative.
Recall that mangroves become more important for
persistence of the population when excessive fishing effort
levels are applied to the reef because the mangroves can
directly offset the negative impacts of fishing effort. The
“buffering” effect identified earlier translates directly into
value, as is illustrated in Fig. 4b where the opportunity
costs of clearing the mangroves increase with increases in
fishing effort.
We also show in the supplementary material that, as the
availability of mangroves reaches zero, the opportunity cost
in the obligate case goes to positive infinity, while in the
facultative case, it goes to a finite level. In the obligate
setting, therefore, it never pays to clear the entire mangrove
habitat, while under a facultative association, that result is
possible depending on the other opportunity costs associated
with clearing mangrove habitats.
Our results illustrate the importance of utilizing the
incremental (or marginal) value for policy decisions
(Bockstael et al. 2000), as opposed to total or average
values that are commonly used in habitat valuation studies
(Costanza 1997). For instance, consider the case in Fig. 4c,
where we represent the marginal costs dV(ET,L)/dM, the
average costs V/M for an obligate setting, and two hypo-
thetical demand curves for coastal development projects. If
the mangroves are relatively pristine, and the regulator uses
the average value rather than the marginal, then the result
can be less clearing that what is economically efficient. On
the other hand, if the mangroves are not intact, then using
the average value that first increases and then decreases
as the coverage of mangroves goes to zero can result in
clearing more acres than what would be cleared if the
marginal opportunity costs are employed. Although not
illustrated, other possible scenarios include where V/M is
everywhere above or below dV(ET,L)/dM.
Opportunity costs evaluated at the optimal effort level
We have been calculating the opportunity cost taking the
effort level as fixed by a regulator. But another way to
measure the opportunity cost is to substitute in the optimal
effort level for each level of mangrove availability (see
Fig. 2c and d), such that we are looking at the change in the
optimal value of the fishery for a change in mangroves.
The opportunity costs at the optimal effort levels are equal
to:
Facultative :
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2SmW 0 Mð Þ
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Not surprisingly, the opportunity costs are a function of the
mangrove coverage, which is still treated as exogenous to the
fishery management decision. Comparing Eq. 8 and 9,
the marginal opportunity costs in the obligate setting are
larger than in the facultative setting, and the difference
depends on the difference in the survivorship (Sm−Sr)/Sm.
Overall, the qualitative properties do not change when
we insert the optimal effort levels—the opportunity cost
increases as the loss of mangroves increase. One important
difference, however, is that in the obligate setting, the
opportunity costs are finite as the coverage of mangroves
goes to zero. The implication is that it is now possible that
the benefits from clearing can outweigh the costs, even for
very small levels of mangrove coverage. This stems from
the fact that as the mangrove coverage declines, the optimal
level of fishing effort to apply also decreases and with it so does
the value of the fishery and the opportunity cost from clearing.
Two points are worth noting about this result. First, we are not
determining the economically optimal level of mangroves to
conserve—such a calculation would need to investigate the
total economic value associated with mangroves. Second, the
result highlights how coastal restoration activities map into
the value of commercial fisheries and that there are incentives
for the fishers to pay for coastal restoration activities.
Another interesting difference between the two cases can
be seen by comparing Eqs. 7 and 8. In particular, we find
that there is a reversal on how the opportunity costs of
mangroves vary with respect to changes in the quality of
the sea grass beds (θ). When fishing effort is set
exogenously by the regulator, the opportunity cost decrease
with improvements in the quality of the sea grass. On the
other hand, when the optimal effort level is employed, the
opportunity costs increase with changes in the sea grass
conditions. In the latter case, improvements in sea grass
beds translate into greater optimal effort levels (see
equation S.6 in supplementary material). Higher levels of
optimal fishing effort, in turn, increase the total value of the
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fishery which results in higher opportunity costs. This
reversal is a multiple-habitat analog to the findings on the
importance of the institutional setting in the previous single
habitat analyses (Barbier 2000).
Discussion
Measuring values of ecosystem services requires under-
standing how ecological “production” functions lead to
economic values (Heal et al. 2005; Kremen and Ostfeld
2005), often as a result of complex spatially dependent
processes such as ontogenetic migration. The scarcity of
bioeconomic models that can both illuminate how
ecosystem service values of habitats are generated in such
settings and illustrate how species–habitat associations
affect these values is therefore surprising. To fill this gap,
we developed a stylized economic–ecological model of
species–habitat associations that nests both obligate and
facultative behaviors.
It is important to point out that not all species undertake
ontogenetic migrations, as many species recruit directly to
their adult habitat. However, many commercially important
species do exhibit ontogenetic migration among habitats. In
the Caribbean, for example, such migrations occur in at least
one species of the most commercially important taxonomic
groups on coral reefs: lobsters (e.g., Panulirus argus), conch
(e.g., Strombus gigas), groupers (e.g., Epinephelus striatus),
barracuda (Sphyraena barracuda), snappers (e.g., Lutjanus
apodus), and grunts (e.g., Haemulon plumieri) (though
species in the family Carangidae constitute an exception).
The strength of ontogenetic migrations exhibited by our
Caribbean case study are perhaps particularly strong
because the region’s low tidal range allows mangrove
prop-roots to remain permanently inundated, providing a
predictable nursery habitat for juvenile fishes. However, the
methods developed here can be generalized for any system in
which ontogenetic habitat migrations occur. Even on coral
reefs, not all migrations of commercially important species
involve mangroves, though most utilize lagoons in some
way. For example, sea grass beds have been found to be more
important than mangroves for reef fish in East Africa
(Dorenbosch et al. 2005), and other lagoonal habitats are
important for the humphead wrasse (Cheilinus undulatus)
and squaretail coral grouper (Plectropomus areolatus) in
Micronesia (Tupper 2007). It is worth noting, however, that
compelling evidence of a positive relationship between the
availability of mangroves and fisheries production has been
found for two areas of the Indo-Pacific: Australia (Manson
et al. 2005) and Thailand (Shinnaka et al. 2007).
In our analysis, we abstracted away from the important
spatial aspects of ecosystem service values in order to
derive closed-form analytical solutions. We are currently
developing a spatially explicit model that nests our “one
patch” model illustrated here. None of the qualitative
properties we find differ with additional patches, but the
spatial model does permit us to investigate the role of
connectivity of habitats in a seascape.
Other important extensions are to introduce the role of
time with particular attention on how coastal estuaries and
bays (or lack thereof) contribute to rebuilding of marine
populations (Swallow 1990), heterogeneity in intrahabitat
quality (Aburto-Oropeza et al. 2008), and to introduce
additional species into the analysis where some have
facultative and some have obligate associations. For
example, there are species of parrotfish that have either
facultative, obligate, or no dependence on mangrove.
Indeed, given the importance of parrotfish in grazing algae
on coral reefs and therefore enhancing coral recruitment,
mangroves may play an additional role in maintaining a
high-quality reef habitat for fisheries (Mumby and Hastings
2008). Lastly, it is not clear ex ante how adding, for example,
predator–prey interactions will affect the opportunity cost. A
predator that has a facultative association and eats prey that
has an obligate, for instance, could result in an opportunity
cost that is less than the sum of its parts.
Although we use a highly stylized bioeconomic model to
map ecosystem functions to services, our qualitative
findings highlight the importance of additional ecological
research into how species utilize habitats—a finding that
applies to more than just sea grass–mangroves–coral reef
ecosystems. As we have demonstrated, this research is not
just important for ecological science, but it can and will
influence ecosystem service values that, in turn, will impact
coastal land-use decisions. While refining valuation methods
is not necessarily going to lead to more rational coastal land-
use decisions, it will improve our understanding on the
ecological–economic mechanisms that contribute to the
value of our natural capital assets.
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